Canada describes itself as an Arctic nation, and most of its claims in the North are uncontested: its sovereignty over the Arctic islands and the land of the territories is not in serious dispute. The contested questions are about water and seabed — above all the legal status of the Northwest Passage, the network of channels weaving through Canada’s Arctic archipelago. As sea ice retreats and the passage becomes more navigable, those long-dormant disputes are gaining practical weight.
Background
Canada’s sovereignty over the Arctic mainland and islands was consolidated over the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including the transfer of the Arctic islands from Britain in 1880. What remained unsettled was the status of the waters between those islands.
In 1986, Canada drew straight baselines around the outer edge of the Arctic archipelago and declared the waters enclosed within them — including the Northwest Passage — to be internal waters of Canada. Under that position, the passage is as Canadian as a river or a bay: foreign ships may enter only with Canada’s permission, and Canada may apply its own laws, including environmental rules, in full.
The United States, and to a degree the European Union, take a different view. They regard the Northwest Passage as an international strait — a route through which ships of all nations enjoy a right of “transit passage” that Canada cannot unilaterally restrict. The two positions are genuinely incompatible, and neither side has conceded.
Key actors
The principal counterpart in the dispute is the United States, Canada’s closest ally — which makes the disagreement unusually delicate. Rather than force the issue, the two countries signed the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement, under which the United States agrees to seek Canada’s consent before sending its icebreakers through the passage, while both sides explicitly preserve their differing legal positions. It is a classic “agree to disagree” arrangement.
Other actors shape the Arctic picture: Russia, the largest Arctic state, with its own extensive northern claims and growing military presence; the Arctic Council, the main forum for circumpolar cooperation among the eight Arctic states; and, centrally, Indigenous peoples — Inuit above all — whose presence, use, and occupancy of Arctic lands and waters is part of the legal and moral foundation of Canada’s claim. The federal government, the territorial governments, and Inuit organizations all have roles in Arctic governance.
Numbers
Canada’s Arctic archipelago comprises tens of thousands of islands and one of the longest, most complex coastlines on Earth. The Northwest Passage is not a single channel but several possible routes through this maze. For most of history those routes were choked by ice for all but a few weeks a year, which is why the sovereignty dispute remained largely theoretical. As Arctic sea ice declines, the navigable season lengthens — but the passage remains treacherous, poorly charted in places, and far from a reliable shipping highway. Traffic remains modest compared with established global routes, which is part of why the dispute has not yet been forced to a head.
Policy stakes
A worked example of how such disputes can be resolved came in 2022, when Canada and Denmark settled their long-running, good-natured disagreement over Hans Island — a tiny, uninhabited rock between Ellesmere Island and Greenland — by drawing a border across it and dividing it between the two countries. The settlement was modest in substance but significant in signal: Arctic boundary disputes can be resolved peacefully, by negotiation and law.
The harder questions remain open. The first is the Northwest Passage’s status: if and when traffic rises, the gap between Canada’s “internal waters” position and the “international strait” view will matter for who controls navigation, environmental protection, and security in the channels. The second is continental shelf: under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Arctic states including Canada, Russia, and Denmark have filed overlapping claims to the seabed beyond their coasts, including around the North Pole — claims to be assessed through a scientific and legal process, not seized by presence.
The third stake is capability. Sovereignty in the North is asserted not only through law but through the ability to know what is happening there and to act — surveillance, icebreakers, ports, and a presence that includes and benefits northern and Indigenous communities. Canada’s persistent “Arctic infrastructure deficit” is, in this sense, a sovereignty question as much as an economic one. The indicator to watch is whether investment in northern presence keeps pace with the region’s rising strategic profile.
Reading list
- Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework
- The 1988 Canada–U.S. Arctic Cooperation Agreement
- Government of Canada materials on the 2022 Hans Island settlement with Denmark
- UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and Canada’s continental-shelf submission
- Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Inuit Nunangat materials on Arctic sovereignty and self-determination
This is an evergreen explainer. The Arctic policy landscape is evolving; confirm the latest legal and infrastructure developments before citing.